

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

EMPRESS OF THE NORTH  
JUNEAU, ALASKA

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Docket No.: DCA-07-MM-015

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Interview of: ANDREW GREENE

Juneau, Alaska

Wednesday,  
May 16, 2007

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice,  
at 3:30 p.m.

BEFORE: LIAM J. LARUE

## APPEARANCES:

LIAM LARUE, Operations Group Chairman  
National Transportation Safety Board  
Washington, D.C.

PAUL WEBB  
United States Coast Guard  
District 17  
Pacific Coast

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I N T E R V I E W

(3:30 p.m.)

MR. LARUE: Good afternoon. It is Wednesday, May 16th at about 3:30. We're here in Juneau, Alaska. This is Liam Larue with NTSB. To my right?

MR. WEBB: Paul Webb, D-17.

MR. LARUE: And we're talking with?

MR. GREENE: Andrew Greene, the Cruise Line Agencies of Alaska.

## INTERVIEW OF ANDREW GREENE

BY MR. LARUE:

Q. And let's see, what is your position with Cruise Line Agencies of Alaska?

A. General Port Manager.

Q. And how long have you held that position?

A. In Juneau it's been five years.

Q. And could you describe some of the duties that you have as the Port Manager for Juneau?

A. We're a maritime agency. We handle cruise ship operations and other operations. Our main focus, at this stage with the agency that I work for as Port Manager, is primarily cruise ships, general maritime agency work.

Q. Could you just describe a little bit like day-to-day what you do?

A. Oh, we arrange for boat's provisions, long shore, line

1 handlers, forklifts, gangways, pilots, tugs, that sort of thing.  
2 Just port operations. We also get involved with the day-to-day  
3 needs of a cruise ship for freight, anything from freight to  
4 engine spares. We get involved in supplying and take care of all  
5 the needs of the crew and passengers, whether it be getting  
6 someone to the airport or taking them somewhere to the hospital.

7 Q. Okay. And then on the day of the accident, Monday, May  
8 14th, could you describe what your involvement was with the  
9 Empress of the North and how you found out about the accident and  
10 kind of go through the day from your point of view?

11 A. Okay, I'll try to do it. I may have to go backwards and  
12 forwards to get a timeline, if you will. So if you would, be  
13 patient with me.

14 As vessel agents for the Empress of the North, we were  
15 notified by the Coast Guard of the event. And I was notified by  
16 Lieutenant Bradley Clare at approximately, I don't have the exact  
17 time, but I imagine it was around 3:00, between 3:00 and 3:15 in  
18 the morning, 0315 hours, approximately. And so I proceeded down.  
19 I got some things from the house and made some initial contacts  
20 with our company and with the home office. The home office  
21 actually called me before I could get a hold of them.

22 At probably about 3:30, 3:40 is when I was contacted by  
23 Majestic America Line and got some initial information, basically  
24 how much oil product was onboard, the number of passengers and  
25 crew, the approximate location of the incident and general details

1     that they knew at that point.

2             And so I was heading out the door to go to my office to  
3     do some preliminary things, such as some passenger accountability  
4     related items, getting some forms and other things that may be  
5     needed. And then I had been in contact by Coast Guard on and off  
6     a few times within the next hour determining where I needed to go,  
7     if I needed to go to the RCC or to an emergency operations center,  
8     which was being stood up by the city.

9             And so I was at the office probably until about 5:00  
10    a.m. doing some preliminary things and ordering some staff and  
11    getting some general situation items out of the way, just for the  
12    situation. By this time, I think most of it was being handled  
13    directly by the Coast Guard. And so, at this point, I was mostly  
14    just getting things ready for the future events of the day. And  
15    there were still a lot of unknowns. I believe I arrived at the  
16    Emergency Operations Center probably around 5:30, which is at the  
17    Juneau Police Station in Lemon Creek area.

18            Before that, I had contacted, our staff was mobilized in  
19    Ketchikan at their emergency actions. And we had also notified  
20    Alaska Steamship Response, which is the incident management team  
21    that we use for these type of events. And we had two gentlemen in  
22    town who were part of Alaska Steamship Response that I was able to  
23    contact immediately and have them report to the Emergency  
24    Operations Center and it was Jim Taylor and Robert Kikehoben to  
25    help fill out some of the positions and the ICS structure. We

1 also had a Mike Conway who was also a member of Alaska Steamship  
2 Response also came to the scene. I'm not sure of the exact time.  
3 I believe he was there at 5:30 as well at the Emergency  
4 Operations Center.

5 So we were just mainly staffing up and collecting data  
6 at this point. And then we met, when I arrived at the Emergency  
7 Operations Center, the RCC still had most of the search and rescue  
8 operation that they were involved in. And we probably should have  
9 had an liaison there is what we should have done initially, but it  
10 seemed like things were ramping up, little by little, at the EOC.  
11 And so we went there instead of the RCC.

12 MR. LARUE: What's the RCC?

13 MR. WEBB: Yes, RCC is another name for Rescue  
14 Coordination Center.

15 MR. LARUE: Okay.

16 MR. WEBB: The two things here, you know, search and  
17 rescue, search and rescue and it kind of happens real quick and  
18 it's over with real quick. And then these guys are ramping up the  
19 incident command post for unified command over at the City EOC,  
20 which is inside the police station. And that's the plan for  
21 Juneau to do that.

22 MR. LARUE: Right.

23 MR. WEBB: That way the City, the sector, the  
24 responsible parties and everything are all in the same place, one  
25 space that's secured. And they take over that long-range type

1 stuff, which is just a follow up.

2 MR. GREENE: We are supposed to have a liaison at the  
3 RCC at the initial stages of an event. But that didn't happen  
4 this time for one reason or another. And it worked out fine.

5 There was a little bit of confusion at the EOC where we  
6 were at and what was happening. But needless to say, things  
7 transpired fastly and we got a hold of the situation and had a  
8 briefing and tried to get the early stages of developing unified  
9 command. All at the same time, instead of being so focused on  
10 establishing a unified command, we knew that that was occurring,  
11 but we were still trying to meet the objectives at hand, which is  
12 the safety of life and finding out what was happening with the  
13 passengers, crew, and the vessel.

14 And so, information was flowing back and forth. We  
15 piecemealed it all together and had a somewhat seamless response  
16 and started ordering assets.

17 The next few hours was focused primarily on finding a  
18 place for the Empress of the North to arrive at, because they were  
19 actually underway. I'm not sure of the exact time. You would  
20 know that, but they were on their way and needed a place to go.  
21 And there was discussion about doing a tug escort, you know, what  
22 kind of shape are they in, are they stable? Those types of  
23 questions, stability issues, salvage issues. So that was all  
24 being worked out at the EOC. And we made a determination --  
25 what's that?



1           MR. WEBB: The Captain of the Port and you guys?

2           MR. GREENE: The Captain of the Port was not present,  
3 but his representative was.

4           MR. WEBB: His representative, yes.

5           MR. GREENE: His representative was. So that was a good  
6 contact to have the Coast Guard, there was a Coast Guard member  
7 there present that we could, I believe it was Scott LaMasters  
8 (ph.), if I'm not mistaken, that we were able to, he had direct  
9 connection with the RCC and the Captain of the Port. Whoever his  
10 chain of command was, we could talk to him and he would cover that  
11 representation at the EEOC for the Coast Guard until the unified  
12 command was more formerly established, or could be more formerly  
13 established.

14           So that was very good to have him there. So we could,  
15 there were some command decisions that had to be made by the Coast  
16 Guard that he was able to relay and convey. And we had some  
17 issues that we needed to work out, as far as where we thought the  
18 vessel should go and whether the Coast Guard would let it go and  
19 what would work out best for the investigative aspects, salvage  
20 aspects, and requirements for the tug. And we ordered a tug from  
21 Skagway, which was the nearest tug that could be provided for this  
22 event, without jeopardizing current operations in other ports. So  
23 it was, that tug was sent down and it was six hours out. And the  
24 Empress of the North actually was able to get to Auke Bay before  
25 the tug arrived, but it was safely under. You know, I'm not sure,

1 strike that safely. I will say that it was under its own power  
2 and was able to safely maneuver to the port and be tied up. And  
3 so that was accomplished. There was some talk of having the  
4 vessel wait at the Point Retreat and meet the tug, but it was  
5 decided, in conjunction with our discussion with the Coast Guard,  
6 if the vessel is under it's own steam and it's stable enough to  
7 get to port, the faster the better to get to port. And we  
8 received permission to moor at the ferry system dock and Jim  
9 Beatle (ph.) was part of the Unified, ICS structure from the ferry  
10 system. He was able to procure that. He also relayed information  
11 about the Ferry Columbia, who we knew was receiving the  
12 passengers, and timing and that sort of thing. And so we were  
13 able to work out some of the details for the vessel and the  
14 passengers arriving in that first few hours.

15           The Centennial Hall was procured by the City and Gray  
16 Line of Alaska, as a reception center, Gray Line of Alaska was  
17 procured by our folks to do the passenger care and transportation  
18 aspects of this. The City also provided an ambulance on the scene  
19 for the ferry system or at the ferry terminal and the passengers  
20 came and also at the reception center, in case there were any  
21 medical issues. There is a local militia group, I forget the name  
22 of the Alaska, I can't remember the exact name of their group was  
23 able to provide some assistance with security. And I believe  
24 there was some other ferry employees and others that may have  
25 assisted with that at the ferry terminal. And it was mostly the

1 militia group that helped with security at the reception center.

2           We were very involved in and one of our key elements,  
3 thankfully there was no known injuries or loss of life that we  
4 know of, the biggest issue for us at that time, since we knew that  
5 was a case that everyone was accounted for on the scene as best we  
6 knew.

7           The major issue we had was getting an accurate passenger  
8 and crew list and making sure that we had the exact names of who  
9 was on the Empress at the time the incident occurred. We had a  
10 passenger list, but we knew some people had gotten off in Skagway.

11       And so we were trying to sort that out and we did. We sorted out  
12 the exact details of who was on board and the number of crew. And  
13 also what was critical was which crew stayed on the Empress and  
14 the exact number. And the ones that were coming on the ferry,  
15 they were transferred to the Ferry Columbia coming off, at the  
16 ferry terminal.

17           And we had established a system through previous  
18 training a way to account for people and we used that system for  
19 the first time in real life on this event and were able to have  
20 accurate lists once the people got to the reception center, we had  
21 accurate lists of all the people that had arrived on the ferry,  
22 both passengers and crew. And I have the time, I made so many  
23 notes, there was an exact time that we documented of having a  
24 recheck verification of all who had arrived safely at the  
25 reception facility accounted for checked against the passenger and

1 crew manifests. So that was key in our mind as an essential  
2 element. It had to be done. And the main reason we knew that it  
3 had to be done was so the search and rescue phase could get in and  
4 we could focus on other aspects.

5           Back at the EOC, those first few hours, we had  
6 established some elements of the incident command system. We had  
7 a planning chief, we had an operations chief and some other  
8 elements where we had some public information officers and the  
9 Coast Guard was filling some roles. Alaska Steamship Response was  
10 filling some roles. The city was able to fill some of the roles  
11 in that structure. It was an informal structure and it never  
12 really fully formalized, but again, it may not have been necessary  
13 for this event. Fortunately, it was not more tragic. It could  
14 have been much more tragic and it wasn't.

15           So thankfully, we were demobilizing almost as fast as we  
16 were mobilizing. So, we broke down some elements that we had  
17 established in the ICS structure and sent our operations chief to  
18 be the EOC coordinator that morning when the Empress of the North  
19 arrived at the ferry terminal. And he was helping coordinate the  
20 staging and supplies such as the, we had ordered some assets for  
21 the divers and a damage assessment team to meet the vessel and  
22 landing craft and crew boat and that sort of thing. So, Robert  
23 Kikehoben was our operations chief and he went and filled the role  
24 of on scene coordinator. And he's still filling that role today,  
25 currently. So, the ferry ride, and after the ship arrived first.

1 I don't have the exact time, but it was around 9:30 or 10:00 and  
2 the ferry ride around 11:00, 11:15. And we had the buses staged  
3 already. We had staff to meet the people and they rode with the  
4 buses to account for the people. And when the arrived at the  
5 reception facility, they had lists that compiled together to one  
6 list and that's when we had our final count.

7 Then once we knew that the passengers were safely at the  
8 dock, we had some press conferences we had to attend to. I turned  
9 the command of, I filled the role of IC for the affected party,  
10 even though it wasn't formally established, but I was representing  
11 their interests as best I could in the Emergency Operations  
12 Center. And then I turned that command over to Mike Conway, as I  
13 had to go downtown for some operational issues for the port about,  
14 I think it must have been about 10:00. And then at 11:00 we had a  
15 press conference and then at 12:00 we had a press conference. So  
16 I was downtown during that time and Mike Conway took the command  
17 for the affected party in that time period.

18 When I got back to the Emergency Operations Center, we  
19 had had to handle pretty much the initial states of the salvage  
20 assessment and we had a tug standing by. We had some required  
21 number of assets ordered to respond to the incident. And then we  
22 had a pretty good handle on jets that were booked or chartered and  
23 to get folks back home and the hotels procured. And we had quite  
24 a large staff assisting on that element.

25 I'm not sure how much of that you want in this record

1 but that's it in a nutshell. I mean there are some things, if you  
2 have any questions, I'm happy to go over anything.

3 BY MR. LARUE:

4 Q. Yes, I just want to, you're role is the Incident  
5 Commander at the EOC?

6 A. For the affected party, as a part of unified command.  
7 And we have as part of our drills and exercises in Alaska, we have  
8 used unified command to respond to cruise ship emergencies, so I  
9 was just once piece of that.

10 Q. Okay. So it sounds like there's a written plan that you  
11 all go by?

12 A. We have a written plan. It's mostly to organize the  
13 city's resources. It's not necessarily the plan that we will  
14 follow for our operations in responding to an event. It's a good  
15 guideline that we use and it addresses most of our responses. But  
16 the plan is geared for how the city will organize it's assets.  
17 It's a city plan. It's not necessarily our plan but it is a good  
18 tool to use and it does help show a chain of events and how they  
19 could occur and resources that are available and that sort of  
20 thing. But the plan, again, is the City of Juneau's Cruise Ship  
21 Emergency Response Plan that we were involved in helping them  
22 develop. They developed it, but we were involved in that process.  
23 So it's, for them to organize their resources and how they handle  
24 things, but it's not necessarily our plan.

25 Q. So, correct me if I'm wrong. You fall under their plan,

1 basically? You're a piece of their plan?

2 A. We are written into their plan, our role as a management  
3 staff. The plan itself is more geared towards organizing the  
4 city's resources and assets. It's their plan that they use, for  
5 example, that shows what the fire department's involvement is.  
6 They do it at their hospital. And so it's not our plan, it's  
7 their plain.

8 Q. Right.

9 A. But our role is mentioned in their plan and is addressed  
10 in their plan, but it's not necessarily the plan that we follow.  
11 Ours is more event specific. Theirs is more how to organize their  
12 resources, which is a very good thing to have in an incident.  
13 It's a part of their overall emergency response plan for the city.  
14 It's part of a larger document. And we've drilled it and  
15 exercised it in the past. And they have actually, other  
16 communities have looked at it to adopt, so it's a good guideline.

17 Q. How often do they do drills?

18 A. The city?

19 MR. WEBB: They just had the airport drill.

20 MR. GREENE: Yes.

21 MR. WEBB: We, you guys have the table top up here and  
22 we're just setting here --

23 MR. GREENE: Right.

24 MR. WEBB: -- just so we can tell.

25 MR. GREENE: We have drills and exercises quite

1 frequently. And not just in Juneau, but around the state. We had  
2 them, the last major cruise ship exercise was in anchorage. It  
3 was sponsored by the Coast Guard and Northwest International  
4 Council of Cruise Lines. So that was our last major event.

5 But we have localized drills and exercises throughout  
6 the year. We have our security committee exercises every year.  
7 You know, we take those to different communities. And then there  
8 is localized drills and exercises, whether it's marine fire  
9 fighting or bomb drills or whatever they are. And of course, the  
10 facilities have exercises. So the city gets involved in a lot of  
11 those. And if they don't have it in their community, they'll send  
12 people to the other communities a lot of times to participate.

13 So the plan itself or elements of it are exercised quite  
14 frequently. If the city sponsors an exercise just for that plan,  
15 it's not that often, but other exercises are using elements of  
16 that plan.

17 BY MR. LARUE:

18 Q. And you said the last major cruise ship exercise was in  
19 Anchorage. When was that, do you remember?

20 A. In January. Towards the end of January this year.

21 MR. WEBB: January -- I can get you some times on that.

22 BY MR. LARUE:

23 Q. Now, when these things occurred, are you requested to  
24 participate or is that something you're obligated to do?

25 A. We usually play an active role. We're probably, we're



1 obligated, probably in our role. Are we required? No, but like I  
2 said, we are obligated to participate for our business, our  
3 principals, we are involved.

4 Q. You mentioned earlier on, kind of early on in the  
5 process, something about the staff mobilizing in Ketchikan?

6 A. Oh, our home office is in Ketchikan and one of our first  
7 calls, of course, is to our home office. And the Alaska Steamship  
8 Response has a watch duty phone and Rick Erickson, my boss,  
9 actually in Ketchikan, our Operations Director, he's like third or  
10 fourth on the list to have the watch and he actually had the watch  
11 for this event. So he got the call first on his cell phone. And  
12 we, as a normal procedure, will notify our home office of any  
13 event that we know about. And they begin to take actions to work  
14 and provide resources and assets and things as needed.

15 For example, they worked on securing the tug and working  
16 with the home office on different issues, that sort of thing.

17 Q. Okay. You've been talking about Alaska Steamship  
18 Response. Could you describe what that is?

19 A. There's non-tank vessel regulations for the State of  
20 Alaska which required, I believe it's over a certain tonnage, I'm  
21 not sure of the exact requirements, that vessels are required to  
22 have an incident management team in Alaska. And so this team was  
23 developed. In the past, it had always been the agents and other  
24 folks that we were related to our organization. But this  
25 organization is formed with that same group, but it's a little bit

1 broader and it is more official and it is the response group that  
2 is used for many a cruise ship, cargo-type related events.

3 I believe there are several of these groups in Alaska.  
4 This is just one of them. This is the one that the cruise ship  
5 industry uses.

6 Q. So, basically, you just have to have their number on-  
7 hand in case something like this were to happen, you call them and  
8 --

9 A. Yes, they have to be activated.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And the State of Alaska can activate them or the owners  
12 or agents can activate them, but they are available and they were  
13 activated for this, briefly.

14 Q. And what did they do?

15 A. Help fill the roles in the incident management  
16 structure.

17 Q. Okay, those are those three names you mentioned?

18 A. Right.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Right.

21 Q. So, they've got people, basically all around Alaska that  
22 they --

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. -- call on to answer.

25 A. That's correct.

1           Q.   And those folks would be familiar with the ICS structure  
2   and --

3           A.   Absolutely.

4           Q.   Okay.

5               MR. WEBB:  And you have to have it's a level of training  
6   that, I don't know --

7               MR. GREENE:  It's over 200, I think, ICS, over 200.  And  
8   it has to be drills and exercises, state requirements.  And you  
9   have to meet certain deadlines to prove you can get to any place  
10  in Alaska by a certain time.  And so that's done routinely.

11              I would have to get the exact requirements for the IMT  
12  from the state.

13              BY MR. LARUE:

14           Q.   Who made the final decision on where the ship came back  
15  into?

16           A.   The Coast Guard had to approve the landing site.  We  
17  worked with them to establish that.  We were involved in procuring  
18  the site and making recommendations.  We initially wanted to use,  
19  we call it the Gitkov Dock.  It may have another name.  It's  
20  basically a barge next to the ferry terminal in Auke Bay.  And  
21  we've used that for a number of things in the past, salvage  
22  operations and staging area.  And so, it's a well known, well used  
23  place for these types of events.  It's well equipped.

24              However, it was determined that that pier was too short  
25  for this vessel.  So, we worked with Jim Beatle from the Alaska

1 Marine Highway System to utilize their pier. And that was  
2 approved and the Coast Guard agreed and it was directed to go  
3 there. So, the final decision would have had to have been the  
4 Coast Guard, but we worked together to reach that decision. But  
5 that was their decision.

6 Q. Okay. Now, was there an escort for the vessel?

7 A. No. It was making, this may not be accurate, but the  
8 report we had heard of that is that it was making seven knots and  
9 that it was --

10 MR. WEBB: About eight knots.

11 MR. GREENE: -- eight knots. And so it was outrunning  
12 any tug we could get there to accompany it.

13 MR. LARUE: Okay.

14 MR. WEBB: After it got going, about halfway up Lynn  
15 Canal before you make the turn at Franklin Street there, the  
16 Spirit Endeavor turned around and came back and then followed up  
17 on. So they were with them.

18 BY MR. LARUE:

19 Q. And you went over quickly with the things that you were  
20 doing to prepare for them arriving. What did you have on the pier  
21 waiting for them when they got there, anything special?

22 A. I wasn't on scene there, and so I'm not sure of the  
23 stage of where things we were, but we had a team of divers and  
24 equipment as far as to do the damage assessment, and we had to  
25 order pumps. This was all done by the Operations Section Chief,

1 so I may be wrong on some of this, but the pumps are procured,  
2 landing craft, a, I believe it's a 35 in that area boat, which is  
3 kind of like a crew boat. Since the crew, wasn't sure the crew  
4 could get on and off of the ship, or people could get on and off  
5 the ship at the ferry facility, because they don't marry up well  
6 as far as gangway access and that sort of thing, so that was  
7 procured. And we had transportation procurement.

8 For the vessel itself, the pumps, I'm not sure how many  
9 or what kind. And so a boom. A boom was procured and we had  
10 known that Seapro (ph.) was contracted to come around from  
11 downtown Juneau to Auke Bay with their response equipment. And  
12 Auke Bay had a response vessel on the barge to cover the other  
13 areas. So we know those assets were ordered. We didn't order  
14 those, necessarily. In fact, I'm not sure of the exact person  
15 that ordered those, but it was through the home office contracted  
16 to do that.

17 So, some assets were underway and I may have missed  
18 some, but those were the primary ones that I know about.

19 Q. Okay. What would your function have been at the Rescue  
20 Patrol Center, the RCC?

21 A. A liaison.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Since unified command would not have been established  
24 yet, that would have been our direct link, instead of two  
25 different groups talking to the home office or to the vessel, it

1 would be one communication. That's been our practice in the past,  
2 is to station a person at the RCC. But it worked out well. We  
3 may have doubled up on a couple things. And we may have ran the  
4 risk of ordering a couple things twice, but with the Coast Guard  
5 representative at the EOC who was trying as best he could to get  
6 information back and forth, it worked out. And we would have  
7 gotten out of the RCC pretty quick once we got here and then  
8 probably by mid-morning we would have been at the EOC anyway.

9 Q. You would have been liaison between the home office and  
10 --

11 A. Yes, for the affected party.

12 Q. -- incident commander?

13 A. Right there would not have an incident command. It  
14 would have been mobilizing still. They may have been doing some  
15 things, but in the past practices, what we, in a perfect world, a  
16 perfect scenario, we would have followed protocol to the letter of  
17 the law. We would have had a liaison at the RCC. And as the  
18 unified command was ramping up, we have them pump the information  
19 between the two so that it would be seamless in a perfect world.

20 But, you know, it wasn't really necessary. It would  
21 have been nice. So the home office wasn't talking to two  
22 different people and we weren't trying to get information from two  
23 different people. And instead, EOC calling the home office and  
24 RCC calling the home office, and we'd have one group of people  
25 talking to the home office and that would have been a lot better.

1 But that's not a criticism, that's just an observation.

2 And the mission was accomplished. The objectives were  
3 accomplished. There was no foul play. No harm. That's just a,  
4 maybe an after action though.

5 Q. Lessons learned, type thing?

6 A. Yes, and even that, even if it has a lessons learned,  
7 it's not necessarily a bad thing the way it happened.

8 Q. Okay. And you had mentioned you had some sort of a  
9 training for accountability type purposes?

10 A. Oh, yes. Every drill, every exercise we have has to be  
11 accountability is always a key issue that arises, because it's a  
12 very cumbersome process. And there's no way that you can  
13 establish a set procedure. You can have general guidelines which  
14 we have done but a set procedure will not work for every  
15 situation. But we have a little, basically, it's a power point  
16 that we do and we train folks to our operators or other folks  
17 involved in our industry, who we may use as additional hands.

18 In the past we can, we knew everybody and it was really  
19 easy to get the word out and have somebody organize it and do it  
20 off the cuff. The trouble is that now we've gotten a little bit  
21 larger, well, quite a bit larger. I mean the ships are larger and  
22 the number of people on shore that work it are much larger. So,  
23 to get everybody on the same page, we have this little training  
24 thing. And we actually piloted the program this year in Juneau as  
25 a test, a guinea pig, if you will, a test program. And we've not

1 even completed all of the doing this will all the vendors, the  
2 training.

3 But it's just a PowerPoint, you go through it. It says,  
4 you know, in the case of an event, here's what may happen, here's  
5 where you may be useful in accounting for people and here's how  
6 you do it. And here's some ways it can happen. And do it's very  
7 short, very simple. It takes, you know, maybe a half an hour to  
8 do. And we used it. They used it in real life for this event.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. It's, they call it a Passenger and Crew Accountability  
11 Familiarization. We've got to think of an acronym for that. The  
12 Coast Guard is good at that.

13 Q. And it worked out well?

14 A. It worked out well, fortunately.

15 MR. LARUE: Okay.

16 BY MR. WEBB:

17 Q. Did passenger, did they end up at Centennial Hall?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did they make it far that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. How did that work?

22 A. It worked out very well. We had food organized for  
23 them. Cots were there, chairs, and tables. And the Coast Guard  
24 had forms on the table and there was a lot of people to greet them  
25 and attend to any needs, such as if there were, you know, the city



1 had an ambulance and some folks there if there were people who had  
2 a, for example, if someone needed a prescription, that just always  
3 seems to be a big issue, that was left on the ship, we could  
4 attend to that need. So, we had a lot of people to help and had  
5 some folks helping with security to keep people from leaving the  
6 site unnoted, until everyone was 100 percent verified accounted  
7 for, which is a very key element of this.

8           And so that was a lot of discussion actually at the EOC  
9 before the vessel arrived how we were going to handle that. And  
10 we had a lot of staff from Gray Line of Alaska and from our staff.  
11 And then the Red Cross had some members there. And of course,  
12 the local militia organization had helped with security there.  
13 And also there were some Coast Guard representatives there as  
14 well, Rick Janelle, I know, was there overseeing and making sure  
15 he was our point of contact, which was very very helpful for  
16 passenger accountability. And I know there were some other people  
17 there, probably for investigative purposes. And I don't know who  
18 all was there. But, that was very helpful to have Rick Janelle  
19 from the District. He's the one who I had my staff report to to  
20 give a final list to get to the RCC or whoever needed it for  
21 passenger and crew accountability.

22           Q. Did any of the passengers try to leave, or were they  
23 pretty calm there?

24           A. I was only scene there for press conference, so I don't  
25 really know. But it seemed like they were happy to be there.

1   What I did see was that people were eating and we had 30 minute  
2   announcements from Gray Line of Alaska took care of some of the  
3   passenger cares. We had a public address system arranged by the  
4   conference center to make announcements every 30 minutes. And  
5   then there were all the issues, you know, we had chartered  
6   aircraft, or the home office had chartered aircraft and things  
7   like that to get people safely home. So there was a lot of  
8   announcements and things.

9           Q.   How long did it take you to get the aircraft in and get  
10   it all turned around and get them out of town?

11          A.   I know the aircraft was on the ground. There was a  
12   flight at 1:55 that some people left on. And then there was a  
13   flight, a chartered aircraft that came at 3:30 or 4:00 that most  
14   of the other people went out on. So we were able to get all the  
15   luggage off the vessel, at least most of it, I'm not sure if we  
16   got all 100 percent of it, off the vessel by that time as well to  
17   get that on the plane. And I think there were some people left  
18   after that. And a lot of them stayed in a hotel and left the next  
19   day. And some made their own way, went on, decided to stay up  
20   here and make a trip out of it, still.

21                But we accounted for everyone that left the site, what  
22   they were doing, so that Gray Line of Alaska and our organization  
23   were able to account for everyone that left. So that we knew that  
24   no one was left feeling stranded here.

25                BY MR. LARUE:

1           Q.    You said there were some issues getting the accurate  
2   passenger counts, some people had gotten off in Skagway, how did  
3   you --

4           A.    We had known that.  We have an agency up there and the  
5   home office had known that as well.  But it was on the manifest  
6   that we had, had those names on it still, but we knew they had  
7   gotten off.  We had to just confirm that was indeed still the case  
8   and with total certainty.  So there was a lot of discussion.

9                   We had two different passenger lists.  One was the list  
10   that, as far as I know, that the ticketing staff had in Juneau.  
11   That's the people that were ticketed, the final list that went on  
12   the ship.  And of course, the ship had made a call after that.  So  
13   there was a change after that.

14                   The home office also had a list.  And as far as I know,  
15   that was their internal system.  I don't know what kind of list  
16   that was.  So, we cross checked the two and then followed up with  
17   the home office on a number of phone calls just to make certain  
18   that what we had was the right number and the right names.

19                   There was a super luminary passenger, for example, that  
20   we had to make sure he appeared on the right list and got his  
21   information.  And so, all those factors affected the bottom line  
22   number.  And so we wanted to make sure the number we had and the  
23   people we accounted for was the exact number.  And that was a  
24   little bit tedious because to do something with certainty, you had  
25   rule other things out.  And that's just the way a passenger true

1 manifest go on a voyage port to port. People get off for whatever  
2 reason and embark for whatever reason and we wanted to make sure  
3 the list we had was a list that was accurate at the time the  
4 incident occurred.

5 Q. How long did it take you guys to do that? Do you  
6 remember what time?

7 A. We had a pretty good idea the list we had was fairly  
8 accurate early on in the morning. We had two lists, so we knew  
9 that the list that we had were very close. We had the list, again  
10 from the ticketing agent, and we had the list from the home  
11 office. I don't know their procedures for establishing that list  
12 and how often it's updated, but so we had a pretty good idea. We  
13 had the list, it must have been about 6:00 a.m. or so that we had  
14 the list, or maybe earlier, maybe 5:00. And in fact, it may even  
15 have gone to the RCC first. I'm not sure where it went first.  
16 But we had the list very early on. And it was just a matter of  
17 verifying 100 percent for certainty the list we had, the actual  
18 names and people were accurate.

19 So to have a 100 percent accurate list was later on in  
20 the morning, I don't know, maybe I would say around 9:00, for  
21 example, maybe a time. I know that it was before the ferry came  
22 in that we had crossed checked both lists and then we called the  
23 office a number of times to get an accurate names and number.

24 So the lists that we had we knew were good, but we had  
25 to rule a few things out. We probably would have had -- what we

1    were worried about is that we would end up with a higher number we  
2    were expecting than were actually on the boat.  So, we had to find  
3    out those exact numbers.  So I would say by 9:00, 9:30, just  
4    trying, the timeline, I'm trying to think, maybe even as late as  
5    10:00, we had ruled out a lot of things and had a good handle on  
6    who we were expecting.

7           Q.    How did you rule out those people that got off in  
8    Skagway or wherever they were?

9           A.    In discussion with the home office and they may have had  
10   a contact with a person on the ship or whomever, or with our  
11   Skagway office.  So between all that, we got that figured out.  
12   And it was actually a person from the Coast Guard who spear headed  
13   that effort.

14          Q.    Okay.

15          A.    We just interjected.

16                BY MR. WEBB:

17          Q.    Who was that, do you know?

18          A.    It was Eileen --

19          Q.    (Inaudible)?

20          A.    No, it was --

21          Q.    Jeffers?

22          A.    No, the new gal.

23          Q.    (Inaudible)?

24          A.    There we go.  Sorry.  I should know her name.  It's  
25   Kathy, yes.

1           MR. LARUE: All right. Do you have any more questions?

2           MR. WEBB: No, I think you got it all. All the  
3 questions I had, you answered.

4           BY MR. LARUE:

5           Q. Anything else you can think of off the top of your head  
6 we might need to know?

7           A. No, I'm just, I'm sure I left a lot of details out, so  
8 if you have any more questions along the way, I know a lot of what  
9 I said you know, it's probably not of interest, especially all the  
10 passenger care stuff on shore, but Robert Kikehoben who was on  
11 scene may have a lot more answers for you on assets and things  
12 deployed when the vessel arrived and the timeframe.

13          BY MR. WEBB:

14          Q. Who was he?

15          A. He works for North Pacific Maritime.

16          Q. Okay.

17          A. And he was in town to handle a Navy ship here and so  
18 that worked out conveniently for us.

19          Q. Is that a part of your same company, North Pacific?

20          A. No, it's its own company. It's affiliated, but it's a  
21 separate company.

22          BY MR. LARUE:

23          Q. But he works for who?

24          A. North Pacific Maritime.

25          Q. But he's also an Alaska Steamship Response person?

1           A.    Yes.  The Alaska Steamship Response staff, they all have  
2 other jobs.

3           Q.    Okay.

4           A.    It's not a fulltime group.  It's people in the maritime  
5 industry who were trained to be called out.

6           MR. LARUE:  Okay.

7           BY MR. WEBB:

8           Q.    So you just called out for a Steamship Response --

9           A.    Right.

10          Q.    -- but he was in town for the Navy?

11          A.    For the Navy ship, to handle the Navy ship.  There was a  
12 couple of them.  Jim Taylor and he were both here.  Jim Taylor  
13 went and left the EOC early on and took care of the Navy Ship and  
14 we kept Robert.

15          MR. LARUE:  All right.  Good to go?

16          MR. WEBB:  Yes, I think so.

17          MR. LARUE:  All right.  Well, thank you very much for  
18 your time.  I appreciate it.

19          MR. GREENE:  Thank you.

20          MR. LARUE:  Can you just acknowledge this is being  
21 recorded and we'll shut it off?

22          MR. GREENE:  Sure.  I'll acknowledge it's being  
23 recorded.

24          MR. LARUE:  Thank you very much.  Signing off here.

25                (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:           The Investigation of  
                                  Empress of the North  
                                  Juneau, Alaska  
                                  Marine Accident  
                                  Interview of Andrew Greene

DOCKET NUMBER:           DCA-07-MM-015

PLACE:                   Juneau, Alaska

DATE:                    May 16, 2007

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to  
the recording accomplished at the hearing.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Kimberly J. Zogby  
Transcriber